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Pipeline Right of Way Expropriation in Louisiana
Gerald F. Slattery, Jr.
INTRODUCTION
In Louisiana, the power to expropriate private property for a public 
use, which is an incident of the state’s sovereignty, is granted to pipeline 
companies that transport natural gas and liquid petroleum products under 
circumstances deemed to serve a public purpose. The pipeline companies 
may exercise this power only in consonance with constitutional principles 
striking a balance between the public good and individual rights, and only 
in compliance with procedural requirements that effectuate and protect 
those principles.
This comment discusses the power of expropriation of rights of way 
that pipeline companies in Louisiana may exercise. Part I addresses the 
concept of expropriation, the competing principles that it implicates, and 
the statutes that allow pipeline companies to expropriate property. Part II 
then discusses the procedures that must be followed and the substantive 
issues that must be decided in expropriation proceedings. These issues 
include the authority to expropriate; the public purpose and the necessity 
of the proposed taking; the landowner’s compensation, which includes 
taking damages, severance damages, and other damages; and judgments 
and appeals. 
Part III explains the St. Julien doctrine, a jurisprudential rule now 
codified in a statute. The doctrine addresses cases where an expropriating 
authority, mistakenly but in good faith believing it has the authority to do 
so, occupies property with the consent or acquiescence of the landowner and 
constructs facilities on the surface. Ultimately, the goal of this comment is 
to provide the reader with a basic understanding of the principles of 
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expropriation by pipeline companies and how the power of expropriation 
may be exercised. 
I. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF EXPROPRIATION
A. What Is Expropriation, and Who Can Do It?
Under Louisiana law, “[t]he term ‘expropriation’ . . . is practically 
synonymous with the term ‘eminent domain.’ Expropriation means the 
right to take private property for public purpose and utility upon the 
payment first of just compensation.”1 According to the Louisiana Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeal, the right of a government to expropriate private 
property inheres in the very nature of government.2 Such a power does not 
inhere in private corporations, of course, but by statute a government may 
extend its power of expropriation to certain private corporations that serve 
a public purpose.
In Louisiana, companies the law deems to serve a public purpose 
include those engaged in “the piping and marketing of natural gas for the 
purpose of supplying the public with natural gas”3 and “common carrier 
pipe lines,” meaning those “engaged in the transportation of petroleum as 
public utilities and common carriers for hire.”4 These pipeline companies 
have the power to expropriate private property for use in the conduct of 
their business. The limits on this power are set forth in Louisiana’s
constitution and statutes, as interpreted and applied by Louisiana courts.
B. Constitutional and Statutory Bases for Expropriation
1. United States and Louisiana Constitutions
The premises that the sovereign has power to expropriate privately 
owned property for public purposes and that that power is inherently 
limited by the rights of the individual are recognized in general terms in 
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states: “nor 
                                                                                                            
1. Tenn. Gas Transmission Co. v. Violet Trapping Co., 200 So. 2d 428, 433 
(La. Ct. App.), writ refused, 203 So. 2d 86 (La. 1967) (emphasis added). The 
Louisiana Supreme Court found “no error of law.” “Eminent domain” means “a
right of a government to take private property for public use by virtue of the 
superior dominion of the sovereign power over all lands within its jurisdiction.”
Eminent Domain, WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (9th ed. 1983).
2. Tenn. Gas Transmission Co., 200 So. 2d at 433.
3. LA. REV. STAT. § 19:2(5) (2012).
4. LA. REV. STAT. § 45:251(1) (1980).
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shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.”5
The 1921 and 1974 Constitutions of Louisiana address expropriation 
power and the limits on its exercise in a more detailed fashion. The 1921 
Louisiana Constitution stated: “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, except by due process of the law. Except as otherwise provided 
in this Constitution, private property shall not be taken or damaged except 
for public purposes and after just and adequate compensation is paid.”6
The 1974 Louisiana Constitution went into even further detail, 
replacing the concept of “just and adequate compensation,” which might 
have been subject to a stingy interpretation, with compensation to the 
owner “to the full extent of his loss”:
(A) Every person has the right to acquire, own, control, use, enjoy, 
protect, and dispose of private property. This right is subject to 
reasonable statutory restrictions and the reasonable exercise of the 
police power.
* * *
(B)(4) Property shall not be taken or damaged by any private 
entity authorized by law to expropriate, except for a public and 
necessary purpose and with just compensation paid to the owner; 
in such proceedings, whether the purpose is public and necessary 
shall be a judicial question.
(B)(5) In every expropriation or action to take property . . . a party 
has the right to trial by jury to determine whether the compensation 
is just, and the owner shall be compensated to the full extent of his 
loss. Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the full 
extent of loss shall include, but not be limited to, the appraised value 
of the property and all costs of relocation, inconvenience, and any 
other damages actually incurred by the owner because of the 
expropriation.7
The 1974 Louisiana Constitution thus establishes that a private entity 
may not expropriate property unless it is “authorized by law” to do so; that 
the taking must be for a purpose that is both “public” and “necessary”; that 
the judge, rather than the jury, shall determine whether the purpose of the 
taking is public and necessary; and that a jury may determine the amount 
of money needed to compensate the owner of the expropriated property 
                                                                                                            
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
6. LA. CONST. art. I, § 5 (emphasis added).
7. LA. CONST. art. I, §§ 4(A), (B)(4)-(5) (emphasis added).
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“to the full extent of his loss.” According to the Louisiana Supreme Court, 
“to the full extent of his loss” means that the owner “should be ‘put in as 
good a position pecuniarily as he would have been had his property not 
been taken.’”8 The Louisiana statutes address in detail the procedure for 
the exercise of the legal authority to expropriate, the resolution of disputes 
about that authority, the public purpose for a proposed taking, the necessity 
of the taking, and the compensation due the owner of expropriated 
property.
2. Louisiana Revised Statutes 19:1 et seq.
Part I (“General Provisions”) of Title 19 of the Louisiana Revised 
Statutes (entitled “Expropriation”) sets forth the steps that a private 
company with the power to expropriate must follow when it exercises that 
power. Overall, the statutes are evenhanded, striking a balance between the 
power the expropriating entity needs in order to serve a public good and the 
private property rights of the individual. The procedural requirements the 
statutes impose on the expropriating entity, however, reveal a certain 
wariness toward the power to expropriate. This wariness is a change from 
the communitarian, almost socialist, approach in the distant precursor to the 
statutes, former article 2626 of the 1870 Louisiana Civil Code,9 which 
came close to suggesting that the individual owns property only at the 
sufferance of the government:
The first law of society being that the general interest shall be 
preferred to that of individuals, every individual who possesses 
under the protection of the laws, any particular property, is tacitly 
subjected to the obligation of yielding it to the community, 
wherever it becomes necessary for the general use.10
Section 1 of Title 19 expansively defines the property that is subject 
to expropriation as “immovable property, including servitudes and other 
                                                                                                            
8. State Dep’t of Highways v. Bitterwolf, 415 So. 2d 196, 199 (La. 1982) 
(quoting Coleman v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 673 So. 2d 291, 297 (La. Ct. App. 
1996)) (citations and internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
9. Act 841 of 1993 repealed former article 2626 of the Louisiana Civil Code 
of 1870 and redesignated it as LA. REV. STAT. § 9:3176. In turn, that statute was 
repealed by Act 702 of 2012, which also amended several statutes in Part I of Title 
19 of the Revised Statutes.
10. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2626 (1870), quoted in Tenn. Gas Transmission Co.,
200 So. 2d at 433 (referring to former article 2626 as “the sound legal principle[,] 
so well stated . . . .”).
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rights in or to immovable property.”11 Section 2, in relevant part, grants to 
natural gas pipeline companies the power to expropriate12 and, by reference 
to section 251 of Title 45, grants the same power to pipeline companies 
transporting “petroleum” (generally meaning any liquid hydrocarbon) as 
common carriers.13
Section 2.1 of Title 19 addresses where to file a petition for expropriation 
and what the petition must include.14 Section 2.2 shows the solicitude of 
Louisiana law for a person whose property might be expropriated.15 It sets 
forth detailed requirements that the expropriating entity must satisfy before 
it files a lawsuit. These requirements include: (1) providing an appraisal and 
other information to the landowner; (2) making an offer for the property; (3) 
providing information about the landowner’s and the expropriating entity’s
legal rights; and (4) not less than thirty days before filing a suit, providing a 
letter identifying the purpose for the proposed acquisition, the compensation 
to be paid, copies of all appraisals, and detailed information about the 
location and boundaries of the property at issue.16
Section 4 of Title 19, consistent with Article I, Section 4 of the 
Louisiana Constitution, allows juries to determine compensation.17 The 
judge has the power to decide all other issues, such as authority to 
expropriate, public purpose, and necessity.18 Section 8 commands that 
“[e]xpropriation suits shall be tried by preference and shall be conducted 
with the greatest possible dispatch.”19 To that end, if the property owner 
challenges any issue other than compensation, all such issues must be set 
for hearing within thirty days of the challenge, and the court must make a 
decision within five days thereafter. If the expropriating authority wins on 
those issues, the compensation trial will be conducted within forty-five 
days thereafter, subject to extension for good cause.20
Section 9 of Title 19 deals with the compensation owed to the owner 
of expropriated property. It takes a sound approach toward valuation by 
not allowing any consideration—positive or negative—of the effect on 
value of the proposed post-expropriation use of the property: “[T]he basis 
of compensation shall be the value which the property possessed before 
                                                                                                            
11. LA. REV. STAT. § 19:1 (1975).
12. LA. REV. STAT. § 19:2(5) (2012).
13. Id. § 19:2(8). See infra text accompanying notes 26-27.
14. LA. REV. STAT. § 19:2.1 (2012).
15. LA. REV. STAT. § 19:2.2 (2017).
16. Id.
17. LA. REV. STAT. § 19:4 (1975).
18. Id.
19. LA. REV. STAT. § 19:8(A)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
20. Id. § 19:8(A)(2).
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the contemplated improvement was proposed, without deducting 
therefrom any general or specific benefits derived by the owner from the 
contemplated improvement or work.”21 Having thus cautioned against 
inflated or deflated valuations, the statute repeats the constitutional 
mandate that “[t]he defendant shall be compensated to the full extent of 
his loss.”22
Section 12 of Title 19 authorizes, but does not require, an order that 
the property owner pay the costs of the proceedings if the final award in 
the expropriation proceeding is equal to or less than what the expropriating 
authority had earlier offered.23 Section 13 allows only devolutive appeals 
from expropriation judgments, which may include “[t]he whole of the 
judgment,” meaning both the judge-tried issues and the jury-tried issue of 
compensation.24 Section 14 of Title 19, in relevant part, addresses the issue 
of a nongovernmental expropriating entity taking possession in good faith 
of a landowner’s property and constructing facilities upon it with the 
consent or the acquiescence of the owner. In such a circumstance, the 
owner is deemed to have waived his right to receive compensation prior 
to the taking, but he may file suit to determine “whether the taking was for 
a public and necessary purpose and for just compensation . . . as of the 
time of the taking of the property. . . .”25
3. Louisiana Revised Statutes 45:251 et seq.
Title 19, section 2(5) of the Revised Statutes endows natural gas 
pipeline companies with expropriating powers. Part I (entitled “Petroleum 
Pipe Lines”) of Chapter 5 (“Pipe Lines”) of Title 45 (“Public Utilities and 
Carriers”) does the same for pipeline companies that are “common carriers”
of “petroleum.”26 Section 251 of Title 45 defines those terms and the term 
“pipe line” expansively, and section 254 provides that such “common 
carrier pipe lines” shall “have the right of expropriation with authority to 
expropriate private property under the state expropriation laws for use in 
[their] common carrier pipe line business. . . .”27
                                                                                                            
21. LA. REV. STAT. § 19:9(A) (2012) (emphasis added).
22. Id. § 19:9(B). See LA. CONST. art. I, § 4(B)(5) (“[T]he owner shall be 
compensated to the full extent of his loss.”).
23. LA. REV. STAT. § 19:12 (2012).
24. LA. REV. STAT. § 19:13 (1975).
25. LA. REV. STAT. § 19:14(B) (2012). This statute derives from the St. Julien 
doctrine, based on St. Julien v. Morgan L. & T. R. Co., 35 La. Ann. 924 (La. 
1883). See infra text accompanying notes 121-144.
26. LA. REV. STAT. § 45:251 (1980).
27. Id. § 45:254.
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Title 19 of the Revised Statutes, as applied and explained by Louisiana 
courts, maps the process a pipeline company must follow as it proceeds 
toward its goal of constructing a pipeline across expropriated property.
The process begins with an appraisal of the property, continues with an 
offer to purchase, and, if the offer is not accepted by the landowner, 
concludes with an expropriation trial, a judgment, and perhaps an appeal.
II. EXPROPRIATION PROCEDURE, FROM OFFER TO JUDGMENT
A. Appraisal and Offer to Landowner: “Highest and Best Use”
A pipeline company that needs a right of way across a landowner’s
property must first appraise the landowner’s property and inform the 
landowner who performed the appraisal, the value of the property according 
to the appraisal, and which methodology the appraiser employed (market, 
cost, or income approach).28 Then the pipeline company must make an offer 
to the landowner in “a specific amount not less than the lowest appraisal or 
evaluation.”29
In Exxon Pipeline Co. v. Hill,30 the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized 
“three generally accepted appraisal techniques: (1) the market approach; (2) 
the cost approach; and (3) the income approach.” The court explained the 
different techniques and stated its preference: 
Under the market approach, the appraiser considers the market 
value estimate which is predicated upon prices in actual market 
transactions and current listings, i.e. comparable sales. The cost 
approach method requires the appraiser to derive the value of the 
property by estimating the replacement or reproduction cost of the 
improvements; deducting therefrom the estimated depreciation; 
and then adding the market value of the land, if any. Finally, in 
utilizing the income approach, the appraiser uses an appraisal 
technique in which the anticipated net income is processed to 
indicate the capital amount of the investment which produces the 
net income.
                                                                                                            
28. LA REV. STAT. §§ 19:2.2(A)(1)(a)-(c) (2017). The statute actually speaks 
of an “appraisal or evaluation,” but the better practice by far is to commission a 
formal appraisal by a state-licensed appraiser.
29. Id. § 19:2.2(A)(2).
30. 788 So. 2d 1154 (La. 2001).
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[T]he “market approach,” or the use of comparable sales in the 
vicinity of the land sought to be expropriated, is the primary tool 
of analysis of fair market value because it is, in most cases, likely 
to produce more accurate results.31
The Supreme Court in Hill further explained the term “fair market 
value” and how it relates to another concept, “highest and best use”:
Fair market value has consistently been defined as the price a buyer 
is willing to pay after considering all of the uses that the property 
may be put to where such uses are not speculative, remote or 
contrary to law. . . . [C]onsideration is to be given to the most 
profitable use to which the land can be put by reason of its location, 
topography, and adaptability. . . . This theory, of taking the latter 
factors into consideration, is commonly known as the “highest and 
best use” doctrine.32
Elaborating on “highest and best use,” the Supreme Court explained 
that the concept is informed by several factors: market demand, proximity 
to areas “already developed in a compatible manner with the intended use,”
economic development, development plans of businesses and individuals, 
scarcity of land available for the intended use, negotiations with other 
prospective buyers and whether they made offers, and the use of the 
property at the time of the taking.33
The Supreme Court then articulated an important presumption that 
applies in expropriation lawsuits and identified which party has the burden 
of overcoming the presumption: “[T]he current use of the property is 
presumed to be the highest and best use and the burden of overcoming that
presumption by proving the existence of a different highest and best use 
based upon a potential, future use is on the landowner.”34
In Hill, the Supreme Court consolidated for oral argument two cases that 
had been decided by the First Circuit Court of Appeal. In both cases, the 
appellate court had approved the conclusion by the landowners’ appraiser (the 
same person both times) that the “highest and best use” for the expropriated 
properties was the creation of pipeline corridors, valued on a per-rod, rather 
than a per-acre, basis. The Supreme Court found two principal flaws in the 
appraiser’s reasoning. First, his evaluations incorporated the post-
expropriation use of the properties, enhancing value in violation of the rule 
                                                                                                            
31. Id. at 1162-63 (citations omitted and emphasis added). 
32. Id. at 1160 (citations omitted).
33. Id.
34. Id.
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that “the value of land is fixed with reference to the loss sustained by the 
owner, not as enhanced by the purpose for which it was taken.”35 Second, 
although the appraiser utilized the market approach, he considered only 
pipeline servitude comparables, notwithstanding his admission in his 
report that there was almost no data supporting them:
[C]ompensation [in recorded pipeline servitude conveyances] is 
usually recorded as being $10 or $100 and other valuable 
consideration almost without exception and some servitude 
documents include a confidentially [sic] clause (or have some on the 
side). As a consequence, there is no readily available source 
regarding the going market price for pipeline right-of-ways at any 
given point in time. Experience indicates that the pipeline companies 
will not furnish the data when asked, and most individuals will not 
divulge the price paid because of the confidentially [sic] agreement.36
The Supreme Court duly concluded that the First Circuit had erred in 
relying on the method used by the landowners’ appraiser. It reversed and
reinstated the trial court’s award in one of the cases and reversed and 
remanded the other case to the trial court “for a determination of the proper 
value of compensation due to the [landowner], consistent with this opinion.”37
From the perspective of both the landowner and the pipeline company, 
the highest and best use of the property is the whole point of the trial, as it 
“sets the expropriation value of the land.”38 The caveat by the Louisiana 
Supreme Court in Hill that the highest and best use of the property is 
presumed to be its current use39 is very important. The presumption is 
based on the reasonable premise that the landowner in his self-interest is 
using the land in the most profitable way. Additionally, the presumption 
prevents courts from wandering into speculation when determining the 
value of expropriated property. The court in Faustina Pipe Line Co. v. 
Hebert,40 which preceded the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in Hill
by sixteen years, seems to have done exactly that.
In Faustina, the Third Circuit Court of Appeal defined highest and best 
use by reference not to the current use of the land, but rather to some 
“reasonably prospective” use: “[T]he ‘highest and best use’ of a tract of land 
                                                                                                            
35. Id. at 1161 (citing U.S. v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 
53 (1913)).
36. Id. at 1163 n.12.
37. Id. at 1165.
38. Faustina Pipe Line Co. v. Hebert, 469 So. 2d 483, 487 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
39. See supra text accompanying note 34.
40. 469 So. 2d at 487.
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is the most favorable (or highest-priced) use of that land that is reasonably 
prospective. The use may not be merely speculative, but must be shown to be 
reasonably likely to occur in the not-too-distant future.”41 Having defined the 
concept as meaning a possible use rather than an actual use, the Third Circuit 
then ruminated on the issues that a trial court applying the concept would have 
to face. At least to the author, the Third Circuit’s explanation demonstrates 
why its definition of highest and best use is unworkable:
This somewhat nebulous legal standard presents several issues of fact 
to the trial judge. Is the proposed use reasonably suited to the land? 
Is the use merely speculative, or reasonably likely to occur? Is the 
time in which the proposed use is reasonably likely to occur within 
the not-too-distant future, or in the too-distant future?42
This airy pronouncement was made in the context of a case where the 
landowner’s appraiser had opined that the highest and best use of the 
landowner’s forty-acre soybean tract was really residential homesites. The 
appraiser testified that these homesites would require access, which in turn 
would require encasement of the pipeline underneath at least one (imagined) 
residential street crossing.43 The trial court accepted this testimony and 
awarded taking damages, severance damages,44 and encasement costs, all 
based upon the hypothetical use of the property as residential homesites.
The Third Circuit affirmed the lower court, and the Supreme Court denied 
the pipeline company’s petition for a writ of certiorari, over the dissents of 
Justices Dennis and Blanche. Justice Blanche would have granted the writ on 
the issue of severance damages and pointedly stated that “encasement costs 
of a pipeline under unplanned streets in an imaginary subdivision [are] 
speculative.”45 In light of the Louisiana Supreme Court’s subsequent decision 
in Hill, the Third Circuit’s opinion in Faustina is probably not good law and 
should not be relied upon.
B. Before Filing the Petition
If the information and the offer provided to a landowner pursuant to the 
mandate of Revised Statutes 19:2.2A have not induced the landowner to 
                                                                                                            
41. Id. (citations omitted and emphasis added).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 489.
44. “Severance damage in an expropriation case may be defined as a 
diminution in the value of the landowner’s remaining, unexpropriated property 
caused by the taking of the expropriated property.” Id. at 488.
45. Faustina Pipe Line Co. v. Hebert, 474 So. 2d 1295 (La. 1985) (Blanche, 
J., dissenting).
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convey his property to the pipeline company, the pipeline company has 
yet more statutorily required steps to complete before it may file suit. 
Not more than thirty days after its offer, the company must send to the 
landowner a formal notice containing seven statements: (1) that the 
landowner is entitled to receive just compensation to the fullest extent 
allowed by law; (2) that his property may be expropriated only by an entity 
authorized by law to do so; (3) that the landowner is entitled to receive a 
written appraisal or evaluation of the amount of compensation due him; 
(4) identifying the website of the pipeline company, on which the 
landowner can read the relevant expropriation statutes; (5) offering to 
provide, upon request, a copy of the expropriation statutes upon which the 
pipeline company relies; (6) identifying (including name, website, and 
telephone number) the agency responsible for regulating the pipeline 
company; and (7) that the landowner may hire an agent or attorney to 
negotiate with the pipeline company and an attorney to represent the 
landowner in any legal proceedings concerning the expropriation.46
After sending the notice, the pipeline company has still more to do 
before it can file suit. Not less than thirty days prior to filing a petition for 
expropriation, the pipeline company must send the landowner a letter by 
certified mail containing or attaching another seven items of information: 
(1) the basis upon which the pipeline company intends to exercise its power 
to expropriate; (2) the purpose, terms, and conditions of the proposed 
property acquisition; (3) the compensation the pipeline company proposes 
to pay; (4) complete copies of all appraisals of the subject property; (5) a 
“plat of survey signed by a Louisiana licensed surveyor” showing the 
location and boundaries of the property to be acquired; (6) a description and 
the proposed location of any above-ground facilities to be constructed on 
the property; and (7) a statement of the “considerations for the proposed 
route or area to be acquired.”47
Will the information included in these overtures to the landowner result 
in a deal? It is the obvious intent of the statute for the parties to strike a deal,
so that a court proceeding will not be required. However, if the pipeline 
company and the landowner still cannot agree, the pipeline company may 
file its lawsuit and go to trial.
                                                                                                            
46. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 19:2.2(B)(1)-(7) (2017).
47. Id. §§ 19:2.2(C)(1)-(7).
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C. Trial of an Expropriation Case
1. Authority to Expropriate, Public Purpose, and Necessity of Taking
An expropriation lawsuit typically is filed by the expropriating entity—
the pipeline company—against the landowner.48 The pipeline company’s
petition “shall contain a statement of the purposes for which the property is to 
be expropriated, describing the property necessary therefor with a plan of the 
same, a description of the improvements thereon, if any, and the name of the 
owner if known,” and “shall conclude with a prayer that the property be 
adjudicated to the plaintiff with just compensation paid to the owner. . . .”49
As the plaintiff, the pipeline company must prove: (1) it is authorized by 
statute to expropriate private property; (2) the property it intends to 
expropriate will be used for a public purpose; (3) it is necessary that the 
property be expropriated;50 and (4) the amounts the pipeline company 
proposes to pay the landowner for the value of the property taken, for the 
decrease (if any) in the value of the remaining property, and for any other 
damages.51 The legal authority of pipeline companies to expropriate property 
is found in section 2.5 of Title 19 of the Revised Statutes (for natural gas 
pipelines) and in section 254 of Title 45 (for “petroleum”52 pipelines). The 
statutes do not limit expropriation power to intrastate companies, as evidenced 
by the Louisiana Fourth Circuit’s statement in Collins Pipeline Co. v. New 
Orleans East, Inc.:
Because Collins’ pipeline begins in Louisiana and terminates in 
Mississippi it is regulated by the Interstate Commerce Commission 
rather than by the Louisiana Public Service Commission. However, 
this does not preclude Collins from expropriating under the authority 
of R.S. 45:251, 254 because 45:251 includes “all persons engaged in
                                                                                                            
48. Sometimes the landowner, not the pipeline company, is the plaintiff. See 
infra text accompanying notes 78-79.
49. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 19:2.1(A)(2), (3) (2012).
50. Unless there is “an express stipulation by the parties” as to these three 
issues. LA. REV. STAT. § 19:8(E) (2012). 
51. LA. REV. STAT. § 19:2.2 (2017).
52. Broadly defined in LA. REV. STAT. § 45:251 (1980) as “crude petroleum, 
crude petroleum products, distillate, condensate, liquefied petroleum gas, any 
hydrocarbon in a liquid state, any product in a liquid state which is derived in whole 
or in part from any hydrocarbon, and any mixture or mixtures thereof; provided, 
however, that such term shall not include methanol synthetically produced from 
coal, lignite, or petroleum coke.”
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the transportation of petroleum” and does not restrict “persons” to
intrastate carriers.53
Will the proposed taking actually serve a public purpose? In other 
words, will the pipeline company be acting as a “common carrier” when 
it transports product through the proposed pipeline? Louisiana courts have 
not taken a rigid approach when they analyze this question. For example, 
when the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal addressed the issue, it 
relied upon a United States Supreme Court case where the pipeline 
company was held to be acting as a common carrier—hence serving a 
public purpose—notwithstanding that it was the sole owner of the oil being 
transported through its pipeline.54 The Supreme Court stated, “While 
Champlin technically is transporting its own oil, manufacturing processes 
have been completed; the oil is not being moved for Champlin’s own use. 
These interstate facilities are operated to put its finished products in the 
market in interstate commerce at the greatest economic advantage.”55
The courts’ broad understanding of “public purpose” means that a 
relatively short pipeline segment carrying natural gas or petroleum, perhaps 
only from one privately owned location to another, may nonetheless be held 
to serve a public purpose. Further, its owner may be held to be a common 
carrier with powers of expropriation, if the pipeline segment is integrated 
into a larger system of pipelines. In Crooks v. Placid Refining Co.,56
landowners questioned whether a pipeline that traversed their property 
was in fact being used for a public purpose. The Louisiana Third Circuit 
Court of Appeal noted that the pipeline segment “was part of a system
linking over four hundred miles of pipelines used to collect, transport, and 
deliver crude oil, produced from over three hundred wells and operated by 
fifty different operators, to a central facility in Searcy, Louisiana.”57
Rejecting the landowners’ contention, the court continued: “The Louisiana 
jurisprudence has not defined ‘public purpose’ so narrowly . . . . Rather, 
any allocation to a use resulting in advantages to the public at large will 
suffice to constitute a public purpose.”58
                                                                                                            
53. 250 So. 2d 29, 33 (La. Ct. App. 1971) (citing Dixie Pipeline Co. v. Barry, 
227 So. 2d 1 (La. Ct. App. 1969)).
54. Champlin Ref. Co. v. U.S., 329 U.S. 29, 34 (1946) (emphasis added); 
Collins, 250 So. 2d at 33.
55. Champlin, 329 U.S. at 34 (emphasis added).
56. 903 So. 2d 1154 (La. Ct. App. 2005).
57. Id. at 1156 (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 1165 (emphasis added) (quoting Town of Vidalia v. The Unopened 
Succession of Ruffin, 663 So. 2d 315, 319 (La. Ct. App. 1995)). See Tex. Pipe 
Line Co. v. Stein, 190 So. 2d 244, 250 (La. Ct. App. 1966), rev’d on other 
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Similarly, in ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. v. Union Pacific R.R. Co.,59 a
pipeline company sought to expropriate property in order to construct a 
private, at-grade crossing over railroad tracks. The railroad argued that the 
crossing could not be expropriated because only the pipeline company—
not the public—would ever use it.60 Both the trial court and the court of 
appeal agreed with the railroad and denied expropriation.61 The Louisiana 
Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the crossing would help the 
pipeline company serve its larger public purpose:
While actual public use of the servitude may play a role in the 
appropriate case in determining whether the expropriation serves 
a public purpose, we do not read the constitutional provision and 
the statutes . . . as restricting expropriating real estate to that on 
which the pipeline itself is placed, nor do we interpret these 
provisions and the jurisprudence as requiring direct public use as 
the sole factor in determining whether the expropriated property 
will serve a public purpose.62
A corporation that has the power to expropriate property for a public 
purpose wears the mantle of the public interest. It holds this power almost 
as a trustee63 and cannot exercise it unless doing so serves the public 
interest. That is the rationale underlying the court’s holding in Tennessee 
Gas Transmission Co. v. Violet Trapping Co.,64 a decision with an unusual 
fact pattern that demonstrates the strength of a pipeline company’s power 
of expropriation. 
In Tennessee Gas, a pipeline company filed an expropriation lawsuit to 
obtain a right of way for a high-pressure gas line.65 The pipeline company 
prevailed at trial, but while the landowner’s appeal was pending, it settled 
with the landowner and obtained a contractual right of way.66 The 
agreement settling the lawsuit and granting the right of way anticipated the 
                                                                                                            
grounds, 202 So. 2d 266 (La. 1967) (“‘actual public’ use is not the criteria [sic]
by which public purpose is determined”).
59. 35 So. 3d 192 (La. 2010).
60. Id. at 195.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 197 (emphasis added).
63. But not quite. A trustee is prohibited from acting in his own self-interest, 
see LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2082 (2001) (“A trustee shall administer the trust property 
solely in the interest of the beneficiary.”), while a corporation exercising its 
expropriation power acts both in its self-interest and in the public interest.
64. 200 So. 2d 428. 
65. Id. at 430.
66. Id. at 432.
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need for a second pipeline, and the landowner and the pipeline company 
agreed that “the second line to be constructed [would] be laid in the same 
canal as the first line.”67
Six years later, the pipeline company was ready to construct the second 
pipeline, but its engineers believed that it should be laid in a separate canal.68
In the ensuing expropriation lawsuit for another right of way, the landowner 
argued that the pipeline company could not prove the necessity for a second 
right of way because it had earlier agreed that the second pipeline would 
be laid in the same canal as the first.69 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal 
framed the question before it as follows:
[T]he question is whether the plaintiff by the agreement contracted 
away its right of future expropriation of an additional right-of-way
in the event sound engineering principles should then indicate it
to be a better of plan of construction. . . . The uncontradicted 
opinions of the engineers are that it should be laid in an entirely 
separate canal. However, aside from the question of engineering 
principles, there is an important legal question to be considered—
whether such an agreement is enforceable against the public 
interest.70
For the Fourth Circuit, it was easy to answer this question:
[A] public utility, which enjoys the right of expropriation by virtue of 
its serving public purposes, cannot contract away that right granted 
to it by law for the public benefit. . . . [The pipeline company] did not 
and could not contract away its power of expropriation. It may take, 
according to law and for a just compensation first paid, additional 
land of defendant for the construction of its new pipeline, irrespective 
of the agreement. . . .71
The necessity of a proposed taking, like the public purpose for the 
same, is part of the pipeline company’s burden of proof at trial.72 This is 
not a very heavy burden, however, because “necessity” relates to “the 
necessity of the purpose for the expropriation not the necessity for a 
specific location.”73 Further, if the necessity of the purpose for the 
                                                                                                            





72. See Coleman v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 673 So. 2d 291, 296-97 (1996). 
73. Id. at 296.
108 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VI
expropriation has been proved, Louisiana courts tend to defer to the 
decisions by the pipeline company about the extent and location of the 
property to be expropriated. The Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal 
explained by saying:
Once public necessity is established, the extent and the location of 
property to be expropriated are within the sound discretion of the 
expropriation authority and determination of same will not be 
disturbed by the courts if made in good faith. . . . The amount of 
land and the nature of the acreage taken must be reasonably 
necessary for purpose of the expropriation, but it is not necessary 
“to show actual, immediate, and impending necessity for the 
expropriation.”74
2. Landowner’s Compensation: Value of Property Expropriated, 
Severance Damages and Other Damages
An expropriating entity must compensate a landowner for all of the 
damages he has sustained, including the value of the property taken; the 
diminution (if any) in the value of his remaining property, attributable to 
the taking or to the use of the taken property; and other damages (if any). 
Louisiana Intrastate Gas Corp. v. Girouard75 contains a straightforward 
analysis by the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal of these types of 
damages. The court decided compensation was owed to the landowners 
for (1) the taking of a permanent right of way and temporary servitudes 
for work space in order to lay the pipelines; (2) severance damages, based 
upon the landowners’ appraisal expert’s testimony that “there is a definite 
public fear of living near a pipeline . . . and the presence of one will 
decrease the sale value of adjoining property for residential purposes;”76
and (3) additional claimed damages for loss of crawfish crops, 
bulkheading in order to prevent washouts where a pipeline crossed a 
bayou, and sodding.77
                                                                                                            
74. Id. at 296-97 (quoting City of New Orleans v. Moeglich, 126 So. 675, 
677 (La. 1930)). See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 156 
So. 2d 297, 302 (La. Ct. App. 1963) (internal citations omitted) (“[I]n the location 
of rights-of-way considerable discretion is vested in the expropriating authorities 
and the courts will not disturb or interfere with the exercise thereof in the absence 
of fraud, bad faith, or conduct or practices amounting to an abuse of the 
privilege.”).
75. 336 So. 2d 1042 (La. Ct. App. 1973).
76. Id. at 1046.
77. Id.
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The most important principle considered in the valuation of property 
in expropriation proceedings is that “the value of land is fixed with 
reference to the loss sustained by the owner, not as enhanced by the purpose 
for which it was taken.”78 This principle was implicated in St. Charles Land 
Co. II, L.L.C. v. City of New Orleans, an “inverse condemnation” case, so 
called because the landowners sued the City of New Orleans through its 
expropriating authority, the New Orleans Aviation Board, alleging that their 
property had been taken without proper expropriation proceedings and 
without just compensation.79 The Aviation Board had earlier purchased a 
tract of land from the plaintiffs, but had occupied an additional eight acres 
that were not included in the sale,80 on which it was constructing the 
extension of a runway. The landowners sought compensation for the 
taking and attorney’s fees and costs.81
The only issue at trial was the compensation owed to the landowners, 
so the only witnesses were real estate appraisal experts and a wetlands-
permitting expert.82 Compensation depended on the valuation of the 
property.83 At the time of the taking, the property was unimproved, unprotected 
wetlands and a canal bottom.84 It was in this condition that the Aviation Board’s
expert valued the property:
[The expert] explained that he valued the property in the condition 
it was in at the time of appropriation, which was partially a canal 
bottom and partially unimproved wetlands. In determining the 
highest and best use of the property, [he] ignored the adjoining 
public project for which it was being purchased. Rather, he 
determined the highest and best use of the land in the context of
the general market place and without any consideration of the 
airport’s influence on the property.85
The landowners’ experts, on the other hand, “valued the property as a 
key parcel needed for complete assemblage of the airport complex,”
resulting in valuations more than fifty times higher than the Aviation 
                                                                                                            
78. Hill, 788 So. 2d at 1161 (emphasis added).
79. 167 So. 3d 128 (La. Ct. App. 2014), writ granted, 171 So. 3d 268 (La. 2015).
80. The Aviation Board and the property owners believed that the additional 
eight acres had been included in the act of sale until they discovered otherwise 
forty-eight years later. Id. at 131-32.
81. Id. at 132.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 134. 
85. Id. at 133 (emphasis added).
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Board’s expert’s valuation.86 The discrepancy was whether the property 
should be valued as undeveloped and outside levee protection, as the 
Aviation Board’s expert had done, or as “high and dry,” as the landowners’
experts had done:
[The landowners’ experts] explained that they valued the property 
as “high and dry” because regardless of whether [the Aviation 
Board] had ever expanded the runway and constructed a levee, the 
property would have nonetheless been protected by a levee under 
the federal levee project, or the Lake Pontchartrain Hurricane 
Protection Plan.87
The trial court found the testimony of the Aviation Board’s expert 
more credible and valued the property in its condition at the time of the 
taking as unimproved, unprotected wetlands and a canal bottom. On 
appeal, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal discussed the concepts 
of “full extent of loss,”88 fair market value, and highest and best use. The 
court duly cited the principle that “[t]he current use of the property is 
presumed to be the highest and best use,”89 but concluded that the 
landowners had rebutted the presumption with their “expert testimony that 
the property would have been protected by the anticipated federal levee 
system regardless of the runway expansion project.”90 It therefore 
amended the trial court’s judgment by increasing the compensation award 
to account for the “high and dry” valuation by the landowners’ experts.91
The Fifth Circuit’s conclusion in St. Charles Land Co. is problematic. 
One of the landowners’ appraisal experts had testified that the anticipated 
federal levee system was “well-known in the real estate market in 1987.”92
The trial court found, however, that the property never was included within 
a federal levee system; the Aviation Board provided hurricane protection 
for it at its own expense.93 It seems the Fifth Circuit should have rejected 
the Aviation Board’s “high and dry” assumption for the same reason the 
trial court did. The Fifth Circuit’s ruling may have disturbed the Louisiana 
Supreme Court because it granted the Aviation Board’s petition for a writ 
                                                                                                            
86. Id. at 132-33.
87. Id. at 133.
88. See LA. CONST. art. I, § 4(B)(5) (“[T]he owner shall be compensated to 
the full extent of his loss.”).
89. St. Charles Land Co., 167 So. 3d at 136 (citing Exxon Pipeline Co. v. 
Hill, 788 So. 2d 1154, 1159 (La. 2001)).
90. Id. at 137.
91. Id. at 139.
92. Id. at 137.
93. Id. at 134.
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of certiorari.94 Apparently the parties then settled because the granting of 
the writ was the last event in the history of the case.
Severance damages are another component of the compensation owed 
to a landowner whose property has been expropriated. They are defined as 
“a diminution in the value of the landowner’s remaining, unexpropriated 
property caused by the taking of the expropriated property or the use to 
which the expropriated property is put.”95 The Third Circuit Court of 
Appeal in Faustina gave a good example of such damages:
[W]hen a portion of a homeowner’s front yard is expropriated to 
widen a road, not only must the taker compensate for the acquired 
land, but . . . the taker must also pay the homeowner for any 
diminution in the value of his or her homesite that occurs because 
a smaller lot is in fact less marketable or because the presence of 
a wider road (with prospective heavier traffic) in itself lowers the 
value of the remaining property.96
Takings by pipeline companies may give rise to unique concerns that 
justify severance damages, at least where residential property is close to 
the expropriated tract, “because the primary cause of a gas pipeline’s
diminution of the value of contiguous residential property is the threat of 
leaks and explosions. . . .”97 Whether this threat is real or imagined is 
beside the point:
[G]asoline pipelines are dangerous and have the psychological 
effect of deterring prospective purchasers which has the effect of 
impairing the market value of the property. . . . Evidence that there 
is no real danger or reason to fear any danger is virtually 
irrelevant and has no force against the fact that the fear exists and 
is unavoidable. The fear of danger in some cases is as bad as the 
danger itself—it is a condition—not a theory.98
For nonresidential property, the severance damages issues arising 
from expropriation for a pipeline are different. The taking may interfere 
with or thwart development plans for commercial or industrial property, 
                                                                                                            
94. St. Charles Land Co. II, L.L.C. v. City of New Orleans, 171 So. 3d 268 
(La. 2015).
95. Faustina, 469 So. 2d at 488 (emphasis added).
96. Id. (emphasis added).
97. Id.
98. Collins, 250 So. 2d at 37-38 (citations omitted and emphasis added).
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as in Louisiana Intrastate Gas Corp. v. Gulf Outlet Lands, Inc.,99 or may 
disrupt the efficiency of mechanized farming operations on agricultural 
property, as in Columbia Gulf Transmission Co. v. C. J. Grayson, Inc.100
These cases show that severance damages, as well as taking damages, are 
affected by what the court decides is the highest and best use of the 
landowner’s property.
3. The Judgment: Adjudication of Property, Award of Compensation, 
and Perhaps Attorney’s Fees
A pipeline company that is successful in an expropriation lawsuit is 
entitled to a judgment recognizing its ownership interest in the expropriated 
property. Depending on the evidence and the relief the pipeline company 
prayed for in its petition, the judgment might award a servitude, which will 
give the pipeline company only the right to use the land and not the actual 
ownership of it, or actual title to the property. 
In Louisiana Land and Exploration Co. v. Parish of Jefferson,101 the court 
attempted to construe three judgments in prior expropriation proceedings, to 
determine whether they had adjudicated to Jefferson Parish only servitudes 
or full ownership of three tracts on which a canal was situated.102
The court reproduced in its opinion the decretal portions of the three 
judgments that had been rendered in favor of Jefferson Parish more than 
twenty years earlier. One of the judgments “recogniz[ed] the Parish of 
Jefferson . . . as having the full ownership of the following described 
property . . . .”103 The other judgments lacked this “full ownership” language 
and used the words “right of way” in their property descriptions, although 
their awards of damages to the landowners referred to “the land above 
described, acquired by the plaintiff . . . .”104 Construing the judgments, the 
court held emphatically that these were distinctions without a difference.105
According to the court, “there is not a single word or passage that even 
remotely suggests that these judgments merely awarded a servitude to the 
Parish,” and the term “right of way” did not “designate the res expropriated, 
                                                                                                            
99. 542 So. 2d 705, 707 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (citing pipeline’s interference 
with access of remaining property to public highway and improvements for 
marine, commercial, and industrial uses).
100. 232 So. 2d 150, 155 (La. Ct. App. 1970) (citing “serious disruption of an 
efficient mechanized farming operation”).
101. 59 F. Supp. 260 (E.D. La. 1945).
102. Id. at 262.
103. Id. at 263-64 (emphasis added).
104. Id. (emphasis added).
105. Id. at 265.
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but merely . . . indicate[d] points of reference from which the metes and 
bounds of the tract were set out.”106
The content of a judgment, not only its wording, may be problematic. 
In Marathon Pipe Line Co. v. Pitcher, the trial court held, and the court of 
appeal affirmed, that the highest and best use of certain undeveloped 
property was as a residential subdivision.107 The installation of the pipeline 
would impede the construction of a necessary access road to the yet unbuilt 
subdivision.108 The solution of the courts below, on the suggestion of the 
pipeline company, was a conditional obligation of the pipeline company 
to encase the pipeline if and when the access road was ever built: “[I]n the 
event defendant, or her successor in title, constructs the street described 
hereinafter across plaintiff’s pipeline, and it is necessary for plaintiff’s
pipeline to be encased or otherwise protected to permit construction of said 
street, such encasement or protection shall be accomplished at the expense 
of plaintiff . . . .”109
For the Louisiana Supreme Court, the issue was whether this 
conditional obligation satisfied the constitutional requirement that a 
landowner whose property is expropriated “shall be compensated to the 
full extent of his loss.”110 The court, in a four-to-three decision, held that 
it did not:
This diminution in value is not . . . compensated under the obligation 
imposed upon plaintiff by the Court of Appeal “in the event 
defendant, or her successors in title, construct the street.” Such a 
contingency, which may or may not occur, is one the fulfillment of 
which requires that Marathon Pipe Line Company be in existence 
and be the owner of the pipeline when the obligation to encase 
becomes executory. This is so for there is no obligation imposed 
upon Marathon’s successors or assigns. Added to this uncertainty is 
a further condition that encasement will depend upon whether “it 
is necessary for plaintiff’s pipeline to be encased.” This leaves 
open for future controversy and litigation the question whether 
encasement of the pipeline is then necessary.111
                                                                                                            
106. Id.
107. 368 So. 2d 994, 995 (La. 1979).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. LA. CONST. art. I, § 4(B)(5).
111. Marathon, 368 So. 2d at 996.
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The four-justice majority in Marathon accordingly held that the owner of 
expropriated property has not been compensated to the full extent of his 
loss “unless compensation is paid in money prior to the taking.”112
Attorney’s fees may also be a component of the judgment in an 
expropriation proceeding. If the highest amount that the pipeline company 
offered prior to the lawsuit is less than the sum of the taking damages and 
severance damages awarded, the court has the discretion to award 
reasonable attorney’s fees to the landowner.113 Conversely, if the pipeline 
company’s highest offer before the lawsuit is higher than the final award, 
the defendant landowner is potentially liable not for the pipeline 
company’s attorney’s fees, but only for “all or a portion of the costs of the 
expropriation proceedings.”114
When the pipeline company pays the adjudicated compensation to the 
landowner or into the court’s registry “for the benefit of the persons entitled 
thereto,” it is “entitle[d] . . . to the property rights described in the judgment 
of expropriation.”115 The “persons entitled thereto” for whose benefit the 
deposit into the court’s registry is made may include the landowner’s
mortgagees and privilege holders. In that event, the adjudicated property 
passes to the pipeline company free and clear of all such encumbrances, and 
the money paid into the registry is distributed to the mortgagees and 
privilege holders according to their priority.116
D. Appeals
Pursuant to the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, a party aggrieved by 
a judgment may appeal in one of two ways: devolutively, in which 
circumstance the effect of the judgment is not suspended while the appeal is 
pending,117 or suspensively, in which circumstance, provided the appellant 
has posted security, the effect of the judgment is suspended such that it 
may not be enforced while the appeal is pending.118
Only devolutive appeals are allowed in expropriation cases. Section 
13 of Title 19 of the Revised Statutes is emphatic about this: “No party to 
any expropriation proceeding shall be entitled to or granted a suspensive 
appeal from any order, judgment, or decree rendered in such proceeding, 
whether such order, judgment, or decree is on the merits, exceptions, or 
                                                                                                            
112. Id. at 998 (emphasis added).
113. LA. REV. STAT. § 19:8(A)(3) (2012).
114. LA. REV. STAT. §19:12 (2012).
115. LA. REV. STAT. § 19:10 (1975).
116. LA. REV. STAT. § 19:11 (1975).
117. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2087 (2017).
118. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2124(B) (2017).
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special pleas and defenses, or compensation, or any or all of them.”119
Although the method of appeal is restricted, the range of issues about which 
an appellant can complain is not. Title 19 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes 
states, “[t]he whole of the judgment . . . shall be subject to the decision of 
the appellate court on review under a devolutive appeal . . . .”120
III. THE ST. JULIEN DOCTRINE
It may happen that a pipeline company, in the mistaken but good faith 
belief that it is entitled to do so, possesses and constructs facilities upon a 
landowner’s property with the consent or acquiescence of the landowner. 
In such a circumstance, the landowner thereafter may not treat the 
occupation and construction as a trespass, but “shall be entitled only to 
bring an action for judicial determination of whether the taking was for a 
public and necessary purpose and for just compensation . . . as of the time 
of the taking of the property. . . .”121
The principle underlying Section 14 of Title 19 of the Revised Statutes 
is referred to as the St. Julien doctrine, derived from the Louisiana 
Supreme Court’s 1883 decision in St. Julien v. Morgan L. & T. R. Co.122
In that case, the defendant railroad company had entered onto the 
plaintiff’s land without permission, and laid railroad tracks without
purchasing or expropriating the property.123 According to the Supreme 
Court, the landowner had acquiesced in the action of the railroad and had 
even encouraged it “by abstaining from any attempt to prevent it and 
[making] no complaint in a court of law of the injuries inflicted upon him 
until the defendant had expended large sums of money in completing its 
line.”124
The Supreme Court did not welcome the landowner’s later suit; it held 
that such an owner, because of his acquiescence and encouragement, 
“shall not be permitted to reclaim his property free from the servitude he 
has permitted to be imposed upon it, but shall be restricted to his right of 
compensation.”125 Many years later, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of 
Appeal explained the St. Julien doctrine, stating:
                                                                                                            
119. LA. REV. STAT. § 19:13 (1975) (emphasis added).
120. Id. (emphasis added).
121. LA. REV. STAT. § 19:14(B) (2012).
122. 35 La. Ann. 924 (La. 1883).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 925, quoted in Cancienne v. Lafourche Parish Policy Jury, 423 So. 
2d 662, 665 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
125. 35 La. Ann. at 926. 
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The landowner could not later reject the occupant, but was relegated 
to an action for compensation and damages. The theoretical 
justification of St. Julien was the combined presumed consent of the 
owner of the land and the public interest. To avoid the needless 
waste and public inconvenience involved in removing expensive 
works, the court established the fiction that the owner had granted 
voluntarily what an expropriation suit otherwise would have 
compelled him to yield.126
Many cases applied the St. Julien doctrine until 1976, when the 
Louisiana Supreme Court in Lake, Inc. v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.127
abolished the doctrine, because the court believed that it sanctioned a 
method of creating servitudes contrary to the requirements of the Louisiana 
Civil Code and that as a matter of policy it was no longer needed.128
The Louisiana legislature responded that same year, in effect 
overruling Lake by enacting Revised Statutes Title 19, section 14. As the 
Cancienne court explained: “Therefore, the St. Julien Doctrine, created 
and perpetuated jurisprudentially until the Lake decision in 1976, now has 
been essentially reinstated legislatively through La. R.S. 19:14 to the status 
of positive law.”129
According to the First Circuit in Cancienne, the St. Julien doctrine, 
now codified in section 14 of Title 19 of the Revised Statutes, requires (1) 
an expropriating authority, which, (2) acting in good faith and (3) with the 
consent or acquiescence of the landowner, (4) has constructed a facility 
that serves the public interest.130 Consent is not the same as acquiescence, 
as consent “is an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation by a reasonable 
person who has sufficient mental capacity to make an intelligent choice,”131
whereas acquiescence “is an act not deliberately intended to ratify a former 
transaction known to be voidable, but [which recognizes] the transaction 
and [is] intended, to some extent at least, to carry it into effect and to obtain 
or claim the benefits resulting therefrom.”132 Whichever is the case, the
                                                                                                            
126. Cancienne, 423 So. 2d at 667 (emphasis added). See Crooks, 903 So. 2d 
at 1158 (“Absent consent or acquiescence, proof of public benefit would not be 
enough to defeat an action for trespass.”). 
127. 330 So. 2d 914 (La. 1976).
128. Cancienne, 423 So. 2d at 666.
129. Id. at 667.
130. Id. at 670.
131. Id. at 671.
132. Id. at 672.
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original landowner’s consent or acquiescence will bind subsequent owners 
of the property.133
Lonatro v. Orleans Levee District addressed how to prove whether an 
ancestor in title consented or acquiesced to works on the property of a 
landowner.134 In that case, following the flooding caused by Hurricane 
Katrina, the Orleans Levee District announced its intention to allow the 
United States Army Corps of Engineers to perform extensive work on a 
levee running alongside an important drainage canal in New Orleans.135
Fences, trees, and other obstructions along the foot of the levee would be 
removed, and strengthening and remediation, including “the building of 
structures and ‘deep soil mixing,’ a process using a giant mixer to dig up 
to depths of 40 to 80 feet into the ground,”136 would be performed.137 All 
of this work would be performed in the back yards of those properties 
because the foot of the levee abutted and overlapped the rear boundaries 
of those properties.138 The landowners sued in order to obtain preliminary 
and permanent injunctions prohibiting the work.139
The court addressed whether the defendants had a servitude for the 
levee on the landowners’ properties under the St. Julien doctrine.140 The 
landowners argued that such a servitude could not exist because they had 
never consented to it, while the defendants argued that they did have a 
servitude because the landowners had acquiesced.141 The court said that 
both sides had missed the point: 
The issue . . . is not whether these Plaintiffs consented or acquiesced. 
It is whether the original landowners at the time of the levee 
construction consented or acquiesced. Where the owner at the time of 
the construction has consented or acquiesced, subsequent owners 
take the property subject to the servitude.142
                                                                                                            
133. Id. at 670, quoting Rogers v. La. Power & Light Co., 391 So. 2d 30, 34 (La. 
Ct. App. 1980).
134. 809 F. Supp. 2d 512 (E.D. La. 2011).





140. Id. at 518.
141. Id. at 515-16. 
142. Id. at 519 (emphasis added) (citing Weigand v. Asplundh Tree Experts, 
577 So. 2d 125, 127 (La. Ct. App. 1991)).
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The Lonatro court characterized as a “crucial element” of the St. Julien
doctrine that “either consent or acquiescence is sufficient.”143 It analyzed 
jurisprudence to determine how either is proved and rejected the 
defendants’ argument that the mere existence of the levee on the plaintiffs’
property was sufficient to prove the previous owners’ acquiescence to a 
St. Julien servitude.144 Ultimately the court denied the defendants’ motion 
to dismiss, reasoning that the landowners’ complaint stated their claim 
sufficiently such that they could proceed with discovery.
CONCLUSION
As a pipeline company proceeds through the trial of an expropriation 
lawsuit, it will put on evidence to prove that it has the legal authority to 
expropriate property; that the property it intends to expropriate will be used 
for a public purpose, the accomplishment of which makes the expropriation 
necessary; and that the amount it proposes to pay will fully compensate the 
landowner for his loss, consistent with the “highest and best use” of the 
property.
On the first three of these elements of proof—authority, public purpose, 
and necessity—the pipeline company has an easy burden to carry. Pipeline 
companies have authority to expropriate property under section 2(5) of Title 
19 of the Revised Statutes (for natural gas pipelines) or under section 254 of 
Title 45 (for “petroleum” pipelines). “Public purpose” has been broadly 
defined by Louisiana courts, which generally are satisfied with proof that a 
taking will in some way assist the pipeline to perform its function as a 
common carrier.145 In considering whether the taking was necessary, 
Louisiana courts allow much discretion to pipeline companies, requiring
only that the exercise of that discretion appear to be sound and in good 
faith.146
On the fourth element of proof—compensation to the landowner—the 
pipeline company has the benefit of a presumption about valuation of the 
property, which is that the current use of the property is its highest and 
best use.147 Valuation drives compensation, so the landowner will be 
motivated to try to overcome that presumption by showing that some
                                                                                                            
143. 809 F. Supp. 2d at 520.
144. Id. at 521.
145. See Crooks, 903 So. 2d 1154; ExxonMobil Pipeline Co., 35 So. 3d 192. 
See also supra text accompanying notes 54-63.
146. See Coleman, 673 So. 2d at 296-97. See also supra note 74 and 
accompanying text.
147. See supra text accompanying note 34.
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potential future use is actually the “highest and best,” as in Faustina,148 St. 
Charles Land Co.,149 and Marathon.150 The court’s determination of this 
issue will be important because it will affect both the taking damages and 
severance damages.
Title 19 of the Revised Statutes, as elucidated by Louisiana courts, 
provides clear guidance to pipeline companies and allows expropriation 
proceedings to be accomplished with a minimum of delay. Expropriation 
by agreement rather than by trial is favored, as prior to filing suit, the 
pipeline company is required to appraise the property, make an offer to 
purchase, and provide the landowner with ample information to evaluate 
the offer. If a trial is required, the expedited scheduling requirements, the 
relaxed burden of proof on the issues of public purpose and necessity, and 
the presumption about the highest and best use of the property allow the 
courts to decide contested issues quickly. The public purpose inherent in 
expropriation is promoted, and the property rights of the landowner are 
protected.
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